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1. Introduction1
This article attempts to demonstrate how, in the specific area of investment
and in the framework of external economic relations, the original approach
followed by the European Economic Community Treaty and the European
Community Treaty2 has been replaced by the importation of the approaches
followed by the GATS, NAFTA and BITs. This has been the result of a rather
long evolution, but, in our opinion, CETA is an important leap in this
evolution which, if it finally enters into force, will complete (maybe
irreversibly) the surrender of EU law to GATS and NAFTA/BITs.
The surrender is, first, terminological: GATS and NAFTA/BITs concepts
and terminology have polluted EC and EU terminology. Secondly, the legal
content (and the underlying political approach) of EU law is concerned,
1. The authors have developed these arguments over a very long period, but never before put
them together nor applied them to CETA. Some of the main ideas were first developed in the
highly influential Opinion of the Legal Service of the EU Council of 10 Apr. 1996 (Doc.
6393/96, Restreint, JUR 106, ECOFIN 49, WTO 62, RELEX 13, OCDE 1, ECO 96, MDC 2,
DRS 7). Thereafter, the main references are: Torrent, Derecho y Práctica de las Relaciones
Económicas Exteriores en la Unión Europea (Editorial CEDECS, 1998); Torrent, “Regional
integration instruments and dimensions” in Devlin and Estevadeordal (Eds.), Bridges for
Development. Policies and Instruments for Trade and Integration (Inter-American
Development Bank, 2003), pp. 119–135; Torrent, “Derecho comunitario e inversiones
extranjeras directas: Libre circulación de capitales vs. Regulación no discriminatoria del
establecimiento. De la Golden Share a los nuevos Open Skies”, 22 Revista Española de
Derecho Europeo (2007), 283–312; Pellisé and Torrent, “Les relations entre entreprises et
capitaux publics et entreprises et capitaux privés en droit communautaire et en droit espagnol”,
in Rodríguez Iglesias and Ortiz Blanco (Eds.), Proceedings of the FIDE XXIV Congress, Vol. 3
(Servicio de Publicaciones de la Facultad de Derecho UCM, 2010); Torrent, “The contradictory
overlapping of national, EU, bilateral, and the multilateral rules on foreign direct investment:
Who is guilty of such a mess”, 34 Fordham International Law Journal (2011), 1377–1399;
Torrent, “Pourquoi un revirement de la jurisprudence ‘golden share’de la Cour de Justice de
l’Union européenne est-il indispensable?” in A Man for All Treaties – Liber Amicorum en
l’Honneur de Jean-Claude Piris (Bruylant, 2012); Fernández-Pons and Torrent, “The
(unnoticed?) contradictory overlapping of international and domestic rules on FDI: Getting the
legal facts right”, Singapore Conference of the Society of International Economic Law – SIEL
(2012), <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2091211> (last visited 11 June 2017);
Torrent and Polanco, Analysis of the Upcoming Modernisation of the Trade Pillar of the
European Union–Mexico Global Agreement, Paper requested by the European Parliament’s
Committee on International Trade (2016), <www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/
STUD/2016/534012/EXPO_STU(2016)534012_EN.pdf> (last visited 11 June 2017) as well
as the materials developed by Fernández-Pons, Lavopa and Torrent for the online course “Legal
instruments of international economic relations and regional integration” set up by UNCTAD’s
Virtual Institute and Fundación CEDDET.
2. One of the purposes of the article is to analyse the evolution of EC and EU law. This
creates some difficulties in the drafting because sometimes the references must be to the EEC
Treaty and EC Treaty, others to the TFEU and in some cases the reference is to all the Treaties
and their evolution. Knowledgeable readers will not be misled by this.
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mainly that on “investment”: many readers will probably conclude that CETA
brings to a new height the deregulatory/antiregulatory approach that has
characterized the European Commission’s initiatives and the ECJ case law in
the last two decades. Thirdly, it ends up by eroding one of the main pillars of
EU integration: the role of the ECJ with respect to the Treaties system.
From another perspective, this article dwells on a very general issue that
jurists, in particular those acquainted with the methods of systematic and
teleological interpretation, know well: the very undesirable dreadful
consequences that can result from copying legal rules from one context (e.g.
GATS and NAFTA/BITs) and pasting them into a completely different one
(that of the EU’s external economic law and policy). This should also be well
known to politicians and experts in political analysis, but it seems not to be so.
The path followed by this article is not new, in particular since the
publication of Spaventa’s seminal work on the evolution of the ECJ case law
on the right of establishment.3 The article’s novelty lies in three aspects. First,
it focuses on the EU law of external economic relations and not in the
evolution of the law and case law on the internal market (even if it takes this
into account and many readers can also read the article from this perspective).
Second, it compares the EU law of external relations with GATS, NAFTA and
BITs approaches on the regulation of investment. Third, it leaves the legal
facts to speak for themselves; for this reason, is why we do not take as
background the different “theories” that try to explain or justify
jurisprudential interpretations,4 but an analytical framework able to shed light
on, and sharpen, the reading of legal provisions.
Because of its purpose, the article is based essentially on the examination of
primary sources (the EU Treaties, ECJ case law, and the texts of international
3. See Spaventa, “From Gebhard to Carpenter: Towards a (non-)economic European
constitution”, 41 CML Rev. (2004), 743–773; Spaventa, annotation of Case C-442/02,
Caixa-Bank France v. Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie, 42 CML Rev.
(2005), 1151–1168.
4. Spaventa builds her articles on the discussion of three such theories, or “conceptual
frameworks”: the discrimination theory, the double burden theory and the market access theory.
However, she ends up by accepting that none of them is able “to explain” the “recent” – in 2004
– ECJ “case law on free movement of services and establishment” (Spaventa (2004), op. cit.
supra note 3 at 768). So, she builds a new theory on the basis of the citizenship of the Union,
invoking an individual “right to exercise an economic activity free of disproportionate
regulations” (ibid., 764) and a Member State “duty to refrain from disproportionate interference
with fundamental, economic and non-economic, rights” (ibid., 772). That seems very
debatable. Could it be that what explains the case law is simply an inadequate understanding of
the rules and their implications by the ECJ? Is the ECJ above the suspicion of political error in
a context in which everyone agrees that the EU as a whole has not always taken the right
decisions on some fundamental issues in the last decades? Is the ECJ aware that with the
evolution of its case law it is making the EU law resemble more and more GATS and
NAFTA/BITs?
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agreements). Citations and analysis of well-known articles and case law are
necessary, because, precisely, one of the main purposes of the article is to
examine under a new light provisions that are widely known and cited.
According to standard practice, we will refrain from including long quotations
of provisions in the main text, but we strongly advise the reader to re-read
these very carefully: experience shows that one never fully understands
provisions apparently known by heart; they always offer new angles when
looked at from new perspectives.
After this introductory section, there follows an outline of the analytical
framework used (section 2). Section 3 describes the “triangle” within which
the article is located: EU primary law is compared to GATS, on one side, and
to NAFTA/BITs, on the other; the discussion of each of the sides of the
triangle can seem quite trivial to the specialists of each legal order, but the
comparative analysis is necessary, and has received insufficient attention in
the literature. Section 4 describes how EU law has been colonized by GATS
and discusses the evolution of EU policy and the ECJ’s case law in the areas
covered by the article. Sections 5 and 6 explain how CETA combines (and
compounds) the influences of GATS and NAFTA/BITs, addressing
substantive provisions and so-called investor-to-State dispute settlement
mechanism. Some conclusions, in the seventh section, close the article.
2. The analytical framework:The “legal toolbox” of international
economic relations and regional integration
International economic relations and regional economic integration make use
of a “legal toolbox” in order to mould or shape reality and achieve their goals.
This comprises three types of rules, two techniques for enacting them, and two
methods for the definition of the scope of obligations. We leave aside the
institutional arrangements of each different integration process or those set up
by different international economic agreements, because we rather conceive
them as instruments to guarantee effectiveness of the rules.5
2.1. The three types of rules
Three main types of rules exist in order to conduct international economic
relations and to develop a process of regional economic integration.
5. This analytical framework is extremely simple and some readers may even consider it
trivial. However, and quite surprisingly, it has not been put forward in the literature and is not
widely used for comparative analysis.
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The first is to impose obligations on liberalization of access to markets. The
second is to impose certain non-discrimination obligations on the legal
regime applicable to transactions and operations covered by the agreements –
basically most-favoured-nation (MFN) status, or national treatment (NT)
obligations – without prejudging the remaining content of domestic
legislation. The third is to create uniform legislation establishing common
rules for transactions and operations covered by each agreement. These three
types of rules differ legally and in terms of their political and economic
implications; interpreting, or applying one in order to transform it into another
is very dangerous because, at the very least, it creates legal and political
confusion.
The obligations liberalizing market access are strictly limited in scope to
international transactions.6 The obligations that regard treatment (in
particular if they apply to treatment of foreign firms and professionals after
their establishment in the host country), as well as uniform or harmonized
rules, apply essentially to internal transactions – unless they are simple rules
of non-discrimination of treatment between foreigners (MFN rules) in the
access to the domestic market. These are much more “intrusive” politically
(and, as a consequence, much more difficult to tackle) than rules liberalizing
market access. But many will agree on the thesis that integration cannot rely
solely on liberalization obligations in order to make sense in legal and political
terms. Furthermore, seen from a strictly economic perspective, market
integration is not achieved by simply liberalizing access as long as internal
rules continue to differ.7
6. A clarification is needed here. The analytical framework that we propose must go behind
the terminology, very often misleading, used in many treaties and agreements. One of the
purposes of the article is, precisely, that of explaining how, in very important instances,
“concepts hide reality”. As we shall see later on, one very relevant case is that of Art. XVI
GATS (and articles of agreements that have copied-and-pasted it in other contexts) whose title
is “Market access” but whose main rules (e.g. the prohibition in Art. XVI(2)(a) of GATS of
“limitations on the number of service suppliers whether in the form of numerical quotas,
monopolies, exclusive service suppliers or the requirements of an economic needs test”)
become rules of our third type (rules of uniform law) if they are applied also to domestic service
providers and not only to foreign ones. It should be noted that Art. XI GATT, entitled “General
elimination of quantitative restrictions”, is just a rule on market access according to our
classification, because it specifically forbids import and exports restrictions. As underlined by
Pauwelyn, “Rien ne va plus? Distinguishing domestic regulation from market access in GATT
and GATS”, 4 World Trade Review (2005), 169, Art. XVI GATS is also a rule on domestic
regulation, because it “also applies to measures that cover both foreign and domestic services or
service suppliers”, including measures “indistinctly applicable to imports and domestically”.
7. The best example of this lies in the complete liberalization of capital movements between
EU Member States brought about, first, by secondary law (Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June
1988, O.J. 1988, L 178/5) and, then, by primary law (the new Chapter on capital movements
inserted in the EC Treaty by the Treaty of Maastricht). For many (and in the mind of the General
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Rules on non-discriminatory treatment and rules that create uniform law
also pose a difficult political dilemma, however. Uniform rules serve
integration goals extremely well, but are difficult to set up for three reasons.
First, they are technically difficult to agree on because of the different legal
traditions and contexts of the parties, making it challenging to agree even on
terminology and definitions. Second, they are intrusive in relation to the
internal political process in the sense that they lock-in commitments under
international law, which precludes policy changes that may follow a switch of
domestic governments and political majorities. And third, they threaten the
adaptability of the regional or international scheme, because they are more
difficult to change than domestic rules, requiring a consensus (or in some
cases a qualified majority) among all parties.
Obligations regarding treatment reduce these difficulties by allowing much
greater discretionary power when it comes to domestic legislation, provided
that its content is non-discriminatory. But such obligations also pose other
difficulties. Uniform rules follow the same logic and have the same scope at
the international and domestic levels. This is not the case with international
obligations on treatment (in particular on treatment of enterprises). These
obligations have a sort of double universality: they apply to all sectors and they
cover all aspects of the legal framework applicable to enterprises. On the
domestic front, however, there is not a single rule or set of rules that has this
double universality.8 Different rules apply to different sectors (energy or air
transport, for example) and to different aspects of the legal framework (from
company law to taxation, through labour conditions or expropriation, for
example). With the sole exception of the European Community, experience
shows that far-reaching obligations on treatment of enterprises can be
accepted only if they are accompanied by a list of exceptions. But this list of
exceptions tends to expand exponentially as the number of parties to the
Directors of the Treasury during the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty), this complete
liberalization implied the integration of Member States’ capital markets. It was soon discovered
that this was not at all the case: as the huge amounts of internal legislation regulating domestic
capital markets remained different, the differentiation between Member States’ capital markets
remained also, but with free movement of capital between them: the issue of the “EU single
regulator for capital markets” was born.
8. This notion of “double universality” was one of the more salient and relevant aspects of
the EU Council’s written observations in the framework of the procedure leading to Opinion
1/94,Competence of the Community to conclude international agreements concerning services
and the protection of intellectual property, EU:C:1994:384. The introductory part of these
Observations was later re-elaborated as a conference contribution: see Piris and Torrent, “Les
problèmes juridiques posés à la Communauté Européenne par la conclusion des accords de
Marrakech” in SFDI, La RéorganisationMondiale des Échanges –Actes du 29èmeColloque de
la SFDI (Pedone, 1996).
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agreement increases and, in the end, may overwhelm MFN and national
treatment.
2.2. The two techniques for the enactment of the rules
Two different techniques are used for enacting international economic rules
necessary for conducting international economic relations, as well as regional
integration, and to provide a framework for international public activities. The
traditional distinction between “intergovernmental” and “supranational” aims
at defining them, and the political science distinction between “negative” and
“positive” integration relates also to these two different techniques, but these
distinctions can lead to misunderstandings.9 It is therefore better to use the
more neutral term “two techniques”: either to insert rules on substance into
the treaty that must be complied with by the parties, or to institute some
mechanism for creating new substantive legal rules within the framework of
the treaty. We can refer to rules enacted by means of the first technique as
“primary law” and to rules enacted by means of the second as “secondary
law”. There are advantages and disadvantages to both techniques. The first
tends to strengthen the risk of lack of flexibility and capacity for adaptation,
and the second tends to have the opposite effect.
Any good student of European law knows this distinction. However, it
seems to us that a brief discussion of it remains necessary.
Firstly, this is because an adequate balance between the uses of the two
techniques must be reached in order to achieve the political or economic
objectives pursued. It could easily be argued, but it is not the purpose of this
article, that the Treaty of Maastricht upset the successful equilibrium in the
use of the two techniques that the Treaty of Rome and its modification by the
Single European Act had achieved in the past.10 It can also be argued that, for
9. E.g. when “supranationality” is discussed as a sort of characteristic of EU integration,
forgetting, as we discuss in the text, that “supranational mechanisms” of law creation also exist
in other frameworks, and that many of the foundations of the EU integration process are
“intergovernmental”. Besides, it is also forgotten that the distinction between “negative” and
“positive” integration, from an EU perspective, relates to the substance of the rules
(harmonizing legislation or prohibiting Member States legislation) and this can be the outcome
of either primary or secondary law. One of the pieces of legislation discussed later in the article,
the Bolkestein Directive, is a good example of “negative” integration (in substance) by a
method that usually characterizes “positive” integration (secondary law).
10. The argument would go in the sense that in the new provisions on economic policy
(including movement of capital), “too much” in the way of primary law obligations was
imposed on Member States and “too little” competence was conferred on the EC to enact
secondary law.
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the right of establishment, what it is needed is an adequate balance between the
obligations of primary law and the harmonization of Member State legislation
enacted through secondary law. Trying to “compensate” the lack of the second
by a very broad interpretation of the first is dangerous and is not neutral at all.
Secondly, the distinction should be discussed because it is often forgotten
(and, what it is worse, often denied when this evident legal fact is brought into
the discussion) that the production of “secondary law” is not restricted to the
framework of the EC Treaty and the TFEU. It is also found in a number of
preferential trade agreements (PTAs). It is true that NAFTA relies exclusively
on primary law, but even the Dominican Republic-Central America
FTA (CAFTA-DR) creates a mechanism for the enactment of secondary law
(certainly with a very limited scope).11 Two much more important examples
are: (a) the old Association Agreements of the European Community
(and its Member States) with third countries, from the 1963 Agreement of
Ankara with Turkey to the 1997 Agreement with Mexico and the
“Euromediterranean” agreements, through the 1992 European Economic
Area (EEA) Agreement. All of them set up Joint Councils and Committees
endowed with very wide competences to produce secondary law; and (b) the
WTO, whose Ministerial Conference creates secondary law in two such
crucial areas as waivers12 and new accessions.13 The fact that this creation of
secondary law goes together with the practice of reaching decisions by
consensus is irrelevant for our argument.
2.3. The two methods for the definition of the scope of the obligations
The WTO GATS and later negotiations on services and investment have made
fashionable the jargon of “positive” and “negative” lists as methods to define
the scope of obligations in these areas. However, these techniques apply to any
area covered by regional integration or, more generally, by international
economic legal rules.
On the one hand, it is possible to define general obligations subject to some
exemptions (the obligations apply “unless …”). These exemptions14 exclude
11. See Art. XIX(1) CAFTA-DR, which creates its Free Trade Commission. Para 3 of this
Art. confers specific competences to the Commission to enact secondary law.
12. Art. IX:3 WTO Agreement.
13. Ibid., Art. XIII(2).
14. “Exemptions” (which exclude the application of obligations to cases covered by them)
must be distinguished from “exceptions”, such as the “General Exceptions” contained in Art.
XX of GATT and Art. XIV of GATS, which presuppose: that obligations are applicable to a
measure; that the measure is inconsistent with any of those obligations; but that the measure
can, ultimately, be justified if it has been taken under the conditions provided in the exception
(e.g. it is a measure inconsistent with the general obligation on MFN Treatment of Art. II(1) of
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from the rules’ scope of application some specific sectors, aspects or areas.
This is the case, for example, with Article II of GATS (MFN obligation) and
its Annex of exemptions, or with many obligations imposed by the investment
Chapters of PTAs concluded by the United States.
On the other hand, it is also possible to define the content of the obligations,
but leave the determination of their field of application to a list of
commitments: the obligations apply “only insofar as …” specific cases are
included into a list of specific obligations. For many, this approach, of a
“positive list”, seems synonymous with the schedules of “Specific
Commitments” in the framework of GATS (which certainly applies this
technique, as we shall see). However, it is also applicable to GATT (the
schedules of concessions of Members in the framework of GATT’s Article II
are undoubtedly “positive lists”).
It can be argued that “negative” and “positive” lists can lead to the same
results.15 We will not follow this argument for the following reasons. Of
course, the content of a general obligation can be nearly nullified if the
exemptions (the negative list) are very broad and deep in scope (or if a very
broad “horizontal” exemption is included). And the content of an obligation
whose scope is determined through a positive list can be very broad and deep
if the list is very large. However, the underlying logic of the two techniques is
very different. In the negative list approach, the rationale (and the practice in
most relevant cases) is to establish, or envisage, a “final stage” of full
liberalization (in the case of a rule on market access) or of unrestricted
non-discriminatory treatment (in the case of a rule on treatment), a final stage
that can maybe be reached, or approached, through secondary law. In the
positive list approach, the rationale is different: the idea is to define a “floor”
of liberalization or non-discrimination, which should not be rolled back by
changes in internal policies. Furthermore, if we consider the “double
universality” of the notion of treatment to enterprises (applicable to all sectors
and covering all aspects of that treatment), we can argue that a list of specific
exemptions simply means that we are brought to a “universality of a lower
level”, but ultimately universality (because the negative list defines only the
sectors and aspects excluded but not those that are included, which remains
GATS, but it is necessary to protect public morals or human health). However, exceptions
(carefully drafted) can be an alternative to a “negative” list of exemptions. “Exemptions” are
often presented in the form of “reservations”.
15. See e.g. Fink and Molinuevo, “East Asian Free Trade Agreements in services: Key
architectural elements”, 11 Journal of International Economic Law (2008), 263–311.
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undefined: the list is indefinite).16 Whereas a positive list of sectors will never
reach any level of “universality” (it will simply be shorter or longer, but always
definite).
3. The point of departure: EC law on “investment” versus GATS
and NAFTA/BITs
We must begin by emphasizing a fact so important and incontestable, but
surprising for many (and whose importance is not adequately stressed by most
of those who already know the fact): “investment” was, in principle, a notion
completely alien to EC and EU primary law, until the very tangential insertion,
by the Treaty of Maastricht, of the terms “direct investment” in Article 57 EC
(64 TFEU), concerning possible exceptions to the general principle of free
movement of capital, and the fairly recent introduction, by the Lisbon Treaty
of 2007, of the terms “foreign direct investment” within the matters covered by
the Common Commercial Policy.17
Outside the EU framework, the notion “investment” has been traditionally
used, including the distinction between “portfolio” and “direct” investment.
Differentiating between these two types of investment is not easy. Quite often,
portfolio investment is defined as “cross-border transactions and positions
involving equity or debt securities, other than those included in direct
investment or reserve assets”,18 which, unsatisfactorily, makes the definition
circular and dependent on what is defined as “direct investment”. Taking both
types of investment together, they are defined very often as depending on
distinctions like “short term/long term” or the existence or not of “a lasting
interest”.19 These definitions are unsatisfactory because of their lack of
precision and the impossibility to make them operational.
16. The distinction of different “levels” or “orders” of infinity is well established in
mathematics since Cantor discussed and defined it 140 years ago. See e.g. Matson, “Strange but
true: Infinity comes in different sizes”, Scientific American, 19 July 2007, <www.scientific
american.com/article/strange-but-true-infinity-comes-in-different-sizes/> (last visited 13 June
2017).
17. SeeArts. 206 (ex 131 EC, as amended) and 207 TFEU (ex 133 EC, as amended). On the
scope of the European external competence in the field of investments, see Hinojosa Martínez,
“El alcance de la competencia exterior europea en materia de inversiones”, 53 Revista de
Derecho Comunitario Europeo (2015), 871–907; and the recent Opinion 2/15, Free Trade
Agreement between the EU and the Republic of Singapore, EU:C:2017:376.
18. IMF,Balance of Payments and International Investment PositionManual, 6th ed., (IMF,
2009), p. 110, para 6(54), <www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bop/2007/pdf/bpm6.pdf> (last
visited 12 June 2017).
19. Galeza and Chan, “What is direct investment?”, 52 Finance and Development (2015),
34–35.
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3.1. EU primary law20
The Treaty of Rome avoided these difficulties simply by avoiding the use of
the term “investment” and distinguishing sharply between “movement of
capital” and “right of establishment”. It devoted separate Chapters to the
question of the movement of capital (Chapter 4 “Capital and payments”) on
the one hand and that of the conditions of establishment (Chapter 2 “Right of
establishment”) on the other. The Maastricht Treaty did not change that
distinction although it amended the Chapter “Capital and payments” by
substituting Articles 73b to 73g for Articles 67 to 73 (then renumbered Arts.
56–60 EC). The distinction remains in the currently in force TFEU, which, in
accordance with the Treaty of Lisbon, replaces the old EC Treaty (see the
regulation of the “Right of establishment” in its Arts. 49–55 and that on
“Capital and payments” in Arts. 63–66).
The Treaty of Rome’s approach is not only sound but the best, in analytical
and political terms. Indeed, capital movements from third countries and the
establishment of third-country nationals or companies in a host State are two
different matters, although there is a link between them. International capital
movements are transactions or transfers involving monetary or financial
assets between different countries; they are not necessarily connected with
establishment in a different country from the one in which the capital in
question originated. The establishment in one country of a third-country
national or company presupposes the formation of a subsidiary undertaking,
branch or agency, or the total or partial acquisition of an existing entity; the
capital needed for such formation or acquisition need not come from the third
country of the national or company in question or even from another third
country: it may be obtained on the national financial market of the Member
State in which the establishment takes place.
The “political rationale” underlying the regulation of these two aspects is
quite different, and, generally, managed by different governmental authorities.
The regulation of capital movements depends on “macroeconomic policy”
and, in particular, on the balance and composition of the balance of payments,
on exchange rate policy (which is interdependent and linked to balance of
payments policies), on problems of monetary stability, inflation control, and
so on. It is the domain of the ministries of economy and finance (and, within
20. The first four paras. of this subsection 3.1. are based on the Opinion of the Legal Service
of the EU Council of 10 Apr. 1996, cited supra note 1, regarding the subject “provisions of the
EC Treaty applicable to investment from third countries”. The Opinion had wide repercussions
when it was issued, and it was resurrected in the context of the discussion of the introduction of
a so-called “anti-Gazprom clause” in the third package of EU energy market legislation. See
<www.ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/markets-and-consumers/market-legislation> (last
visited 13 June 2017).
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them, of the treasury undersecretaries and departments) and, in some
countries, of central banks. The regulation of the right of establishment in the
different economic sectors relies on other criteria and factors, because it is not
a matter of macroeconomic policy, but of “sectoral policies” (e.g. banking
policy; telecommunications policy; energy policy; industrial policy). It is the
domain of the sectoral ministries (industry, agriculture, etc.).
The difference between the two issues can easily be seen when analysed in
real-life situations. Countries combine one macroeconomic policy (“one”
meaning a – more or less liberal – unique policy) with distinct sectoral policies
on the right to establishment (“distinct” because they differ from one sector to
another). Several developed and developing countries have carried out, in the
last twenty-five years, a major liberalization of access of capital from third
countries. However, these countries (at least not the developed ones) have not
completely liberalized the establishment for foreign companies or the controls
of domestic companies by foreign capital in sectors of major importance (for
example, air transport, audiovisual or energy).
The Chapter on movement of capital uses mainly our first type of rules:
rules liberalizing market access. Article 63 TFEU imposes a general
obligation to liberalize market access (both to and from EU Member States
and to and from third countries). And the following articles introduce a set of
specific exceptions and confer on the EU some competences to enact
secondary law. However, the Chapter relies mainly on our first technique, i.e.
primary law; the role of secondary law is very limited and concerns only
movements of capital from and to third countries.
Conversely, the approach of the Chapter on the right of establishment,
which, on substance, has remained unchanged since the Treaty of Rome,
follows a completely different approach from that of the Chapter on movement
of capital. First, its main focus is not market access liberalization but
guaranteeing national treatment and, second, it confers on the Union a very
wide competence to produce uniform law through secondary law (conferral
that has been used abundantly in the past, and continues to be used). Primary
law includes also, in other Chapters, uniform law rules applicable to
companies (owned or controlled by EU Member States or their nationals or
under third country ownership or control), for example on competition. Below
we will analyse the main provisions of this Chapter, discussing its rationale
with reference to one of the ECJ’s founding judgments on this issue.
Article 49 TFEU certainly states that “[w]ithin the framework of the
provisions set out below, restrictions on the freedom of establishment of
nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be
prohibited”. But it adds: “Freedom of establishment comporte/importa/
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umfasst/omvat21 the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed
persons and to set up and manage undertakings, in particular companies or
firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 54, under the
conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country where
such establishment is effected, subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating
to capital” (our emphasis). And Article 50 TFEU continues envisaging that:
“In order to attain freedom of establishment as regards a particular activity,
the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the
ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social
Committee, shall act by means of directives….” (our emphasis).
We believe that this EC/TFEU approach to the right of establishment is
perfectly sound. The right of establishment has a very different logic from that
of free movement of goods, services, capital and workers.
Indeed, the exercise of the right of establishment precedes the introduction
into the market of the goods, the services and even the capital (or, at least, the
financial assets for which the monetary assets will be exchanged) that will
then circulate within or between Member States. Access to its own country
market of goods, services, capital and workers can be more or less restricted
(e.g., on age of workers) but no legal act of “entry into the market” is required,
i.e. no legal act is needed before a good or service that has been legally
produced or supplied in the country, or before a financial asset that has been
legally issued in the country, are bought and sold; and there is no need for a
national to carry out a legal act before signing a work contract.
Contrariwise, this is exactly the meaning of “establishment”: nationals
must “establish” themselves (as a firm or as a professional) within their own
markets; they must complete a series of procedures in order to be able to carry
out economic activities: they must“enter” themarket. From the perspective of
other Member States or third countries, establishment is also prior to the
production of goods, provision of services or creation of financial assets in
the host country. Therefore, as far as right of establishment is concerned, the
essential distinction is that between unregulated right of establishment (in
fact, scarcely regulated – e.g. setting up a toy shop – because there are nearly
always requirements to be fulfilled before establishing as an independent
professional or creating a firm) and a highly regulated right of establishment.
When the right of establishment is regulated, there are two problems that
21. For the purposes of this study it is better to keep to the terms used in the four original
linguistic versions of the Treaty of Rome and not use the term found in the later English version
(“shall include”), which, quite obviously, has a different connotation. We do not want to enter
into linguistic discussions because, as the ECJ has taught us, in the end these are solved by
systematic and teleological interpretation.
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appear, from the perspective of regional integration or international economic
relations:
a) The possible discrimination of professionals and firms from other
States (a problem that the Treaty of Rome tackled through the
introduction of a national treatment obligation), and
b) The divergences between national legislation, and the “indirect
barriers” to establishment that they would create towards other
Member States (a problem the Treaty of Rome tackled by con-
ferring on the Community the competence to enact uniform rules
through secondary law).
The ECJ did not have any difficulty in interpreting this set of provisions in an
early judgment, Auer,22 which, exceptionally, deserves an extensive
quotation:
“As regards freedom of establishment, the realization of this objective is in
the first place brought about by Article 52 of the Treaty which provides,
first, that ‘restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a
Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be abolished
by progressive stages in the course of the transitional period’ and,
secondly, that such freedom of establishment shall include the right to take
up and pursue activities as self-employed persons, ‘under the conditions
laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country where such
establishment is effected’.
In so far as it is intended to ensure, within the transitional period,
with direct effect, the benefit of national treatment, Article 52 concerns
only – and can concern only – in each Member State the nationals of
other Member States, those of the host Member State coming already,
by definition, under the rules in question.
However, it may be seen from the provisions of Articles 54 and 57 of
the Treaty that freedom of establishment is not completely ensured by
the mere application of the rule of national treatment, as such ap-
plication retains all obstacles other than those resulting from the
non-possession of the nationality of the host State and, in particular,
those resulting from the disparity of the conditions laid down by the
different national laws for the acquisition of an appropriate professional
qualification.
With a view to ensuring complete freedom of establishment, Article
54 of the Treaty provides that the Council shall draw up a general
programme for the abolition of existing restrictions on such freedom
and Article 57 provides that the Council shall issue directives for the
22. Case C-136/78,Ministère Public v. Vincent Auer, EU:C:1979:34.
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mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of
qualifications.”23
At no point does it cross the mind of the ECJ to interpret the right of
establishment as a “right to establish”, i.e. as a prohibition on the regulation of
establishment (c.q. “the rules in question” establishing “the conditions laid
down for its nationals by the law of the country where such establishment is
effected”). To begin with, “Article 52 concerns only – and can concern only –
in each Member State the nationals of other Member States”. Member State
laws “laying down the conditions of establishment for their nationals” –
provided they are not discriminatory (de iure or de facto) – are not only not
contrary to the Treaty, but they are the premise for its application. They can
certainly give rise to “obstacles other than those resulting from the
non-possession of the nationality of the host State and, in particular, those
resulting from the disparity of the conditions laid down by the different
national laws”. But the Community has the competence to harmonize these
different national laws.
And this case law (and the elimination of those “obstacles”) could have
been easily strengthened, at “the end of the transitional period”, and if the
general programme implemented by the Council had been insufficient, by the
application of the principle of equivalence in the establishment conditions,
recognized by the ECJ, for example, in Vlassopoulou.24
23. Ibid., paras. 19–22.
24. Case C-340/89, Irene Vlassopoulou v. Ministerium für Justiz, Bundes-und
Europaangelegenheiten Baden-Würtemberg, EU:C:1991:193. Irene Vlassopoulou, a Greek
lawyer registered with the Athens Bar, was refused her application for admission as a lawyer by
the German authorities on grounds of not having adequate qualifications. The ECJ ruled that:
“Article 52 of the EEC Treaty must be interpreted as requiring the national authorities of a
Member State, to which an application for admission to the profession of lawyer is made by a
Community subject who is already admitted to practise as a lawyer in his country of origin and
who practises as a legal adviser in the first-mentioned Member State, to examine to what extent
the knowledge and qualifications attested by the diploma obtained by the person concerned in
his country of origin correspond to those required by the rules of the host State; if those
diplomas correspond only partially, the national authorities in question are entitled to require
the person concerned to prove that he has acquired the knowledge and qualifications which are
lacking” (Ibid., para 23). In this manner, even in the absence of harmonizing legislation, the
national authorities were required to recognize the qualification if found to be equivalent, or
otherwise assess if any knowledge or training the applicant received in the host Member State
sufficed to make up for what the applicant’s qualification lacked. See Hatzopoulos, Le Principe
Communautaire d’Équivalence et de Reconnaissance Mutuelle dans la Libre Prestation de
Services (Bruylant, 1999); and Armstrong, “Mutual recognition” in Barnard and Scott (Eds.),
The Law of the Single European Market. Unpacking the Premises (Hart Publishing, 2002),
Ch. 9.
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3.2. EC international agreements
When the EC began to develop its external economic relations (alone or
accompanied by its Member States in so-called “mixed agreements”), it got its
inspiration from the EEC/EC Treaty itself. Bilateral agreements somehow
mirrored the EEC Treaty, in particular in some of its more distinctive features:
the inclusion of a Chapter on movement of salaried workers and the setting up
of mechanisms to enact secondary law. The paradigmatic examples are,
probably, the 1963 Association Agreement of Ankara with Turkey and, nearly
30 years later, the 1992 European Economic Area Agreement (EEAA), also
an Association Agreement. Those two features allowed the ECJ to develop
what is probably, at least from the perspective of external relations, its most
progressive case law: the line of Demirel/Sevince.25
For the EC, foreign direct investment (FDI) came to the fore as an extremely
important policy issue at the end of the 1980s in the context of the
disintegration of the Soviet bloc. Quite detailed provisions concerning both
first establishment and treatment after establishment (named at the time
“operation”) appeared in the first Association Agreements with Central and
Eastern European countries (“Europe Agreements”) and even in the
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia.
But these provisions did not change the EEC approach. They were mainly
rules on treatment: not only national treatment but also, and in particular,
MFN treatment, in order to guarantee that any treatment more favourable than
national treatment granted by the third country to, for example, a US company
or subsidiary, would also be extended to EU companies and subsidiaries. And
the obligations were subject to a negative list of exemptions. Also, in
conformity with the EEC Treaty’s approach, these provisions on
establishment were different from those on movement of capital.
This approach has not completely vanished. The “copy-and-paste”
approach that unfortunately characterizes the practice of international trade
and investment negotiations so much has had, in this context, one positive
consequence. The approach of the Europe Agreements is still clearly
perceptible in the recent EU-Ukraine Association Agreement.26 Its main
provision on establishment (Art. 88, in Ch. 6, Section 2) envisages only
national treatment and MFN treatment: no article on “market access” for
establishment is included.
25. See Case C-12/86, Demirel v. Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd, EU:C:1987:400; and Case
C-192/89, S. Z. Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, EU:C:1990:322.
26. Association Agreement between the EU and its Member States, of the one part, and
Ukraine, of the other part (O.J. 2014, L 161/3) provisionally applied since Nov. 2014 concerning
its political and cooperation provisions and from 1 Jan. 2016 for its trade and economic
provisions.
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3.3. GATS
The outcome of the Uruguay round of negotiations in the framework of GATT
(1986–1994) was a new set of agreements: the WTO agreements, in which a
new version of GATT is included but which also includes two completely new
agreements: one on “trade in services” (GATS) and the other on “intellectual
property rights” (TRIPs). The latter is irrelevant for the purposes of this
article.
The first main characteristic of GATS is that its coverage is not limited to
international exchanges of services but is extended also to establishment (in
the services sectors). This is explicitly stated in its Article I:
“For the purposes of this Agreement, trade in services is defined as the
supply of a service:
a) from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other
Member;
b) in the territory of one Member to the service consumer of any other
Member;
c) by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence
in the territory of any other Member;
d) by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of natural
persons of a Member in the territory of any other Member.”
(emphasis added)
The first two “modes”,27 (a) and (b), cover international exchanges of services
as they have always been accounted for in standard balance of payments
calculations. Mode 4, (d), mainly covers the hypothesis discussed in EU law in
Rush Portuguesa28 and its later case law. Mode 3, (c), is nothing other than
establishment (or FDI, if one does not want to use the traditional EU law
terminology but the terminology forged in other legal systems).29 Indeed,
27. These four possibilities are named “modes” by later articles of GATS (e.g. Art. XVI). In
the jargon, numerals (1 to 4) are used to refer to them, and not letters.
28. The GATS Annex on movement of natural persons supplying services under the
Agreement establishes: “The Agreement shall not apply to measures affecting natural persons
seeking access to the employment market of a Member, nor shall it apply to measures regarding
citizenship, residence or employment on a permanent basis”. Mode 4 refers to the hypothesis
analysed in Case C-113/89, Rush Portuguesa Lda v. Office national d’immigration,
EU:C:1990:142, whether companies have rights to move their workers when providing a
“cross-border” supply of services (of course, under the GATS approach, this would also apply
to establishment under its mode 3, “commercial presence”: whether companies, when
establishing in a foreign country, can also move their workers).
29. Common sense tells us that, in political terms, mode 3 is much more important than the
other modes. As an illustration of this, suffice to recall that, during the negotiations of the
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Article XXVIII of GATS defines “commercial presence” as “(i) the
constitution, acquisition or maintenance of a juridical person, or (ii) the
creation or maintenance of a branch or a representative office, within
the territory of a Member for the purpose of supplying a service”.30
The second main characteristic of GATS, linked to the first, is that it
extends to establishment (i.e. “commercial presence” in the terminology that
GATS invents in its Art. I), for the first time in history, the “market access”
logic and rules typically applied to international exchanges of goods (and
services). This is the effect of its Article XVI on “Market Access”, which
defines six types of measures that are in principle prohibited, unless otherwise
specified in the respective Member’s Schedules.31
Some of the measures in Article XVI(2)(a) to (f) can be difficult to analyse,
but these difficulties are irrelevant for the purposes of this article. It suffices to
share an uncontested conclusion: Article XVI “market access” rules, in the
terms of the legal toolbox analysed above in section 1, apply mainly to GATS
Uruguay round, the European Commission designed a method to evaluate the offers of the other
participants in the negotiation, in which offers on mode 3 were attributed 50% of the total.
30. Art. XXVIII GATS continues by defining “juridical person of another Member” as “a
juridical person which is . . . in the case of the supply of a service through commercial
presence, owned or controlled by: 1) natural persons of that Member; or 2) juridical persons of
that other Member identified under subparagraph (i)”. And, a “juridical person is: (i) ‘owned’
by persons of a Member if more than 50 per cent of the equity interest in it is beneficially owned
by persons of that Member; (ii) ‘controlled’ by persons of a Member if such persons have the
power to name a majority of its directors or otherwise to legally direct its actions”. Therefore,
the reader should be well aware that for the GATS (and for the EU and the Member States in the
GATS framework), Lehman Brothers Spain Holdings Ltd, to take simply on example, is not a
Spanish company (as the Spanish legislation clearly establishes and EU primary law
recognizes), but a US company!
31. It is convenient to list the six measures because they are imported into the EU’s
international agreements. They are:
“(a) limitations on the number of service suppliers whether in the form of numerical quotas,
monopolies, exclusive service suppliers or the requirements of an economic needs test;
(b) limitations on the total value of service transactions or assets in the form of numerical quotas
or the requirement of an economic needs test;
(c) limitations on the total number of service operations or on the total quantity of service output
expressed in terms of designated numerical units in the form of quotas or the requirement of an
economic needs test;
(d) limitations on the total number of natural persons that may be employed in a particular service
sector or that a service supplier may employ and who are necessary for, and directly related to, the
supply of a specific service in the form of numerical quotas or the requirement of an economic
needs test;
(e) measures which restrict or require specific types of legal entity or joint venture through which
a service supplier may supply a service; and
(f) limitations on the participation of foreign capital in terms of maximum percentage limit on
foreign shareholding or the total value of individual or aggregate foreign investment.”
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“mode 3”, i.e. commercial presence, i.e. establishment, in EU terminology.
Therefore, GATS departs radically, in this all-important feature, not only from
the EC Treaties but also, as we will see in the next sub-section, from NAFTA
and BITs.
However, the practical effects of this are minimized by the use by GATS of
the second method for the definition of the scope of obligations discussed in
section 2: the “positive list” method. These “market access” obligations apply
only in terms of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Article XVI to sectors where
market-access commitments are undertaken and under the terms, limitations
and conditions agreed and specified by (each WTO Member) in its Schedule.
And, in many cases, the Schedules are quite limited in scope and, normally, do
not include “sensitive” sectors.
It must also be underlined that GATS, while covering establishment, does
not extend its coverage to “investment” as a whole: it does not cover
movement of capital, except when it is strictly necessary for the exercise of
cross-border supply of services (mode 1) and foreign establishment (mode 3)
in sectors included in the Schedules (see GATS footnote 8 to Art. XVI(1)).
Finally, it must also be emphasized that GATS does not include, in general,
rules of uniform law (the third type of rule in our legal toolbox)32 nor does it
set up a mechanism for its production (the second technique of our legal
toolbox).33 This also constitutes a sharp difference between GATS and
EEC/EC primary law, which a) included some uniform law applicable to
“post-establishment”, for example on competition, and b) conferred on the EC
a wide competence to produce uniform law on the legal regulation of
establishment. However, as mentioned above in footnote 6, GATS rules on
market access for foreign companies become rules of uniform law if they are
also applied to domestic companies. This is, again, a good example of the
unexpected consequences of applying to FDI (i.e. establishment, in EU law)
the “market access liberalization” rationale.
3.4. NAFTA/BITs
It is well known that PTAs with an investment chapter34 and BITs have many
characteristics in common. For the purpose of this article, the characteristics
32. The “Reference papers” that were introduced, for some sectors, after the finalization of
the Uruguay round are very limited in scope and depth and do not invalidate this general
assertion.
33. Without prejudice to the applicability, in the GATS framework, of the general
provisions allowing the WTO to produce secondary law, in particular in the areas of waivers and
accessions, mentioned in section 2 supra.
34. The Canada-US FTA (CUSFTA) was a pioneer in this respect: it was signed by the
leaders of both countries on 2 Jan. 1988. It was among the first trade agreements to address
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of these international investment agreements (IIAs) can be summarized as
follows:
(i) they cover, with a single set of interrelated provisions on “investment”,
both movement of capital and establishment. This is an essential
difference with both EC/EU primary law and GATS, which either
differentiate between these two topics (in the case of EU primary law)
or only cover establishment – i.e. “mode 3” (commercial presence), in
the case of GATS;
(ii) they rely almost exclusively on primary law (an essential difference
with EC/EU law);
(iii) they introduce an ambitious set of provisions of uniform law, in
particular on direct and “indirect” expropriation and “fair and equitable
treatment”.35 This does not create a difference with EC/EU primary
law, which, as we have seen, also includes provisions of uniform law
applicable to companies in their operation, even if the approach and
scope of these provisions are very different from those of NAFTA/
BITs. But it does create a difference with GATS, which generally does
not use this type of rules;
(iv) they introduce an investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism
that allows foreign companies to initiate proceedings against States in
international fora without requesting any sort of permission or au-
thorization from the governments of their countries of origin (“home
States”).
It is also well known that there is an essential difference between NAFTA (and
similar agreements) and recent BITs concluded by NAFTA members (notably
the United States), on one side, and BITs concluded by EU Member States on
the other side. The latter only cover the legal regime applicable to foreign
investors after their investment in a host country (in the jargon,
“post-establishment” treatment) while the former also cover establishment.36
services and include a Chapter on “investment” (Ch. 16). Its definition of the scope of the
Chapter on services (Art. 1401) goes half-way in the direction of GATS as far as the inclusion
of establishment is concerned. The CUSFTA entered into force 1 Jan. 1989. It was superseded
by NAFTA, which includes Mexico, signed in 1992 and entered into force 1 Jan. 1994.
35. “Indirect” expropriation and “fair and equitable treatment” are two notions born in this
legal framework, without adequate equivalents in domestic legislation in most countries. This is
why they have become the main legal and political arguments against BITs.
36. In the jargon, and under the influence of the term “post-establishment”, the term
“pre-establishment” has been coined. This seems quite misleading as “pre-establishment” can
cover everything. For analytical purposes, the distinction in scope relates to
“post-establishment” and “establishment” (or “first establishment” if one wants to take into
account what is mentioned in (ii) below).
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However, this knowledge very often does not extend to two very important
legal facts:
(i) NAFTA and recent BITs concluded by NAFTA members cover cer-
tainly “establishment” but they do not liberalize establishment, i.e. they
do not include “market access liberalization” rules on establishment.
They share the EC/EU logic that the only rules applying to estab-
lishment are those on national treatment;
(ii) BITs concluded by EU Member States certainly do not cover first
establishment, but in practice foreign investors can very easily enlarge
their scope to the establishment phase through “second establishment”,
i.e. by setting up a subsidiary (a holding, for example) in the host State
and then setting up a company from this subsidiary. Any discrimination
against this second establishment would then be covered by the na-
tional treatment rule on “post-establishment” (of that first
subsidiary/holding).
Another essential difference between US-led and EU Member States-led IIAs
is not so well understood, either: while the former tend to include a negative
list of exemptions, the latter do not. This difference has great legal and
political importance, but a discussion lies outside the scope and purpose of
this article.37
4. The colonization of EC/EU law by GATS
The influence of GATS has been widespread outside the WTO framework
where it was conceived. This fact has created an enormous amount of
confusion, in particular when the influence has been exercised on bilateral or
regional agreements that also included (or could include) a chapter on
investment. In these cases, the use of the GATS notion of “trade in services”
(and the set of definitions linked to it) provokes an overlap, at least potential,
between the chapter on services and the chapter on investment traditionally
found in PTAs, which normally uses a broad definition of investment that,
obviously, includes FDI in the services sectors (i.e. mode 3 or commercial
presence when moving to the chapter on services).
37. Indeed, the absence of a list of exemptions in EU Member States’ BITs implies that EU
Member States systematically violate their BITs because they do not exclude from the scope of
their national treatment obligation the EC/EU measures that do not grant national treatment to
foreign investors established in EU Member States (e.g. in sectors of such a great importance as
audiovisual and air transport). See, on this, Fernández-Pons and Torrent, op. cit. supra note 1.
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4.1. EU primary law
The EC and its Member States seemed to welcome the GATS approach
wholeheartedly. The European Commission used it in order to pursue its long
fight to transform the Treaty provision on the Common Commercial Policy
into an article embracing the whole area of external economic relations.38
After failing in the negotiations of the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam,
it finally had a partial success in the Treaty of Nice, which introduced the
notion of “trade in services” in the definition of the scope of the Common
Commercial Policy.
This first colonization of EU law by GATS could and should have been
easily redressed by the ECJ through systematic and teleological (and de lege
ferenda) interpretation: why interpret “trade in services” differently from
“trade in goods”, including establishment within it, in the framework of the
EC Treaty, which dedicates separate chapters to exchanges of services (and to
exchanges of goods) and to establishment in all sectors without distinguishing
whether goods or services are produced in them? Opinion 1/08 of the ECJ,39
precisely on the interpretation to be given to GATS, should have been the right
opportunity for emphasizing that “trade in services” had different meanings in
the WTO and the EU legal order; but only the Spanish Government argued
into this direction.40 In their written observations, the Parliament, the Council
and 14 governments meekly accepted the Commission’s thesis. The result was
the confirmation of the first EU primary law surrender to GATS by accepting
that, in the context of the EC Treaty as modified by the Treaty of Nice, “trade
in services” has the same meaning as in the GATS context. Was the ECJ aware
that its interpretation of “trade in services” would have an extremely short
life? Or was this precisely the reason to issue it on 30 November 2009? Just the
day after, on 1 December 2009, the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. From
that moment on, the ECJ’s interpretation of “trade in services” became
untenable because, as stated above,41 Article 207(1) TFEU also includes FDI
in the definition of the coverage of the EU’s Common Commercial Policy.
Therefore, it is no longer possible to continue interpreting “trade in services”
as covering also the separate notion that appears in the same line, just eight
words later, i.e. “foreign direct investment”.
38. See Torrent (1998), op. cit. supra note 1.
39. Opinion 1/08,Conclusion of agreements for modification of GATS schedules of specific
commitments, EU:C:2009:739.
40. Ibid., para 120.
41. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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4.2. EC’s external economic law
In order to give a quick effect to this enlargement of the scope of commercial
policy in the Treaty of Nice, the European Commission took advantage of the
negotiation of the EU-Chile Association Agreement,42 which was taking
place precisely between the dates of signature (26 Feb. 2001) and entry into
force (1 Feb. 2003) of the Treaty of Nice.
The result was that the EU-Chile Agreement abandons the specific EC
approach and adopts the GATS approach. In order to do so, the scope of its
Chapter on establishment had to be artificially redefined, so as to exclude
from it FDI/establishment in the services sectors,43 already covered by the
Chapter on trade in services through the copying and pasting of Article I
GATS.44 However, as GATS does not cover movement of capital, the
importation of its approach was compatible, in conformity with the EC
Treaty’s approach, with the existence of a separate Chapter on movement of
capital, whose provisions, nevertheless, are very shallow, except when they
are linked to establishment.45
The importation of the GATS approach also extends to that of the positive
list method for the determination of the scope of obligations: the obligations
apply only to the sectors inscribed in the schedule of commitments. More
importantly, this importation influenced the Chapter on establishment
(excluding establishment in services sectors, already covered, as just said, by
the Chapter on trade in services). Indeed, the Chapter on establishment
imports both (a) the use of positive lists for the determination of the scope of
obligations (Art. 99 of the Agreement) and (b) decisively, the use of GATS
Article XVI’s market access rules (Art. 118(2) of the EU-Chile Agreement),
which, again, is simply copied and pasted as Article 97. Article 98 on national
treatment is also taken from Article XVII GATS.
42. Agreement establishing an association between the European Community and its
Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Chile, of the other part, O.J. 2002, L 352/3.
43. Indeed, Art. 130 of the EU-Chile Association Agreement defines the scope of the
Chapter on establishment as follows (emphasis added): “This Chapter shall apply to
establishment in all sectors with the exception of all services sectors, including the financial
services sector.”
44. Art. 95 of the EU-Chile Association Agreement, on “Scope”, provides (emphasis
added): “1) For the purposes of this Chapter, trade in services is defined as the supply of a
service through the following modes: (a) from the territory of a Party into the territory of the
other Party (mode 1); (b) in the territory of a Party to the service consumer of the other Party
(mode 2); (c) by a service supplier of a Party, through commercial presence in the territory of
the other Party (mode 3); (d) by a service supplier of a Party, through presence of natural
persons in the territory of the other Party (mode 4)”.
45. See ibid., Arts. 163–165.
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4.3. The evolution of the ECJ’s case law
The Commission has produced a very useful Guide to the ECJ case law on
Articles 49 et seq. TFEU,46 identifying two stages in the development of the
case law on the right of establishment.47
In the first stage, the ECJ applied the present Article 49 TFEU (ex 52 EEC)
essentially as a provision on national treatment. Of course, the ECJ applied it
very strictly (“Article 52 prohibits all discrimination, even if only of a limited
nature”)48 and taking into account not only “direct” (de jure) but “indirect” (de
facto) discrimination.49 In that phase, the ECJ also seemed perfectly aware
that national treatment is not enough to guarantee “freedom of establishment”
effectively, and must be complemented by the enactment of uniform law
through secondary legislation, as we saw in the quoted Auer judgment.50 The
right of establishment at this point was conceived, fundamentally, as national
treatment plus harmonization.
Later on, the ECJ, mainly on the initiative of the Commission, gave a
decisive anti-regulatory orientation to its case law on the legal regime of
companies and began to declare contrary to the Treaty Member States
non-discriminatory legislation of high political significance. This has two
main strands: one is the “golden shares” strand (covering establishment and
46. See European Commission, “Guide to the case law of the European Court of Justice on
Articles 49 et seq. TFEU”, <www.ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/14687/attachments/
1/translations> (last visited 13 June 2017).
47. On this evolution, see inter alia, Martín y Pérez de Nanclares, “El derecho de
establecimiento” in López Escudero and Martín y Pérez de Nanclares (Eds.), Derecho
Comunitario Material (McGraw-Hill, 2000), pp. 107–121; O’Leary, “The free movement of
persons and services” in Craig and De Burca (Eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP, 1999), pp.
377–416; Daniele, “Non-discriminatory restrictions to the free movement of persons”, 22 EL
Rev. (1997), 191–200; Spaventa (2004), op. cit. supra note 3; Spaventa (2005), op. cit. supra
note 3; and Fernández, “Keck yMithouard y la libertad de establecimiento”, 22Gaceta Jurídica
de la UE y de la Competencia (2011), 5–7.
48. Case C-270/83, Commission v. France, EU:C:1986:37, paras. 21 and 24.
49. The national treatment obligation has been interpreted by the ECJ as applying both to
“direct” and “indirect” discriminatory measures. The discrimination is “direct” when a measure
explicitly treats nationals or companies from other Member States less favourably, e.g.
requiring Spanish nationality for the exercise of private security activities (Case C-114/97,
Commission v. Spain, EU:C:1998:519, para 31). The discrimination is “indirect” when a
measure is presented as apparently neutral but, in practice, it places the national or company
from another Member State in a disadvantageous position, e.g. by requiring residence in the
country (Case C-351/90, Commission v. Luxembourg, EU:C:1992:266, para 19) or a national
diploma in order to exercise an activity, in spite of the fact that the foreign diploma has already
been recognized as equivalent by the host country universities (Case C-3/88, Commission v.
Italy, EU:C:1989:606, para 8). This interpretation is perfectly compatible with the recognition
to States of a very wide regulatory autonomy.
50. Case C-136/78, Auer, para 21, which was extensively quoted in section 3.1. supra.
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movement of capital), in which the ECJ analysed non-discriminatory Member
State provisions on establishment leaving aside the Chapter on establishment
and moving to the Chapter on movement of capital. The foundational
judgments of this strand are the Golden Shares judgments in Commission v.
Portugal,51 Commission v. France,52 and Commission v. Belgium,53 and the
more spectacular later judgment concerning the German Volkswagen Law in
Commission v. Germany.54 The Golden shares case law has already been
criticized by one of the present authors55 and this article is not the place to
discuss it further.
The second strand is that of Gebhard,56 very aptly analysed in Spaventa’s
articles, mentioned above.57 Here, the ECJ construes the first article of the
Chapter on the Right of Establishment as a rule of market access, interpreting
it as a sort of rule granting a “right to establish”. The examples are numerous
and some of them are well known.The more characteristic are, precisely, those
that are completely meaningless in economic terms and simply embody the
political approach of putting under suspicion the regulation of establishment
when it is enacted by Member States and not by the Community/Union. One
significant example would be Case C-140/03,Commission v.Greece.58 In this
judgment, the ECJ ruled that Greek legislation prohibiting qualified opticians
from operating more than one optician’s shop effectively amounts to a
restriction on the freedom of establishment of natural persons within the
meaning of Article 43 EC, notwithstanding the alleged absence of
discrimination on grounds of the nationality of the professionals concerned.
Another example of this trend is the case considering the inconsistency of
Austrian legislation that made the establishment of new dental clinics
dependent on a sort of “economic needs test”.59
Of course, some restrictions can be justified. Article 52 TFEU (ex 46 EC)
already allowed “provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative
action providing for special treatment for foreign nationals on grounds of
public policy, public security or public health”. But this provision only
addresses measures that introduce a “special treatment for foreign nationals”,
i.e. discriminatory measures (which would confirm, by the way, the idea that
51. Case C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, EU:C:2002:326.
52. Case C-483/99, Commission v. France, EU:C:2002:327.
53. Case C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium, EU:C:2002:328.
54. Case C-112/05, Commission v. Germany, EU:C:2007:623.
55. See Torrent (2012), op. cit. supra note 1.
56. Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di
Milano, EU:C:1995:411.
57. See Spaventa (2004), op. cit. supra note 3, and Spaventa (2015), op. cit. supra note 3.
58. Case C-140/03, Commission v. Greece, EU:C:2005:242, para 27.
59. Case C-169/07, Hartlauer, EU:C:2009:141.
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the Chapter on the Right of Establishment was intended to guarantee national
treatment, and only discriminatory regimes needed “to be justified”).
The enlargement of the notion of restriction to encompass
non-discriminatory measures has also certainly led to an enlargement of the
possibilities of justification. But in the absence of a provision such as current
Article 36 TFEU (ex 30 EC) of the Chapter on trade in goods, which enabled
the Cassis de Dijon case law,60 the ECJ has had to rely much more on its own
(political?) judgement. Thus, in Kraus, the ECJ reflected that the lack of
recognition of diplomas obtained in other Member States, even if considered
a restriction in spite of being applied without discrimination, could be
justified if “such a measure pursued a legitimate objective compatible with the
Treaty and was justified by pressing reasons of public interest”.61
The category of “public interest” is open and covers, together with the
typical reasons of “public order, security and public health”, other interests
linked to consumer protection, loyalty in the contracts, fight against the fraud,
preservation of the environment, and so on. The ECJ’s case law has identified
a number of overriding reasons of public interest capable of justifying
restrictions on the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty.62
However, besides responding to “overriding reasons relating to public
interest”, the ECJ case law has added the requirement that the measures “must
be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective they pursue” and “they
must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it”.63 A measure is
considered suitable or appropriate for ensuring attainment of the objective
“only if it genuinely reflects a concern to attain that objective in a consistent
and systematic manner”.64 And it must also pass the test of verification
whether the objective may not be achieved by measures which are less
restrictive. The measures thus remain additionally subject to a test of necessity
and proportionality.
In the last few years, the ECJ has extended its case law to other
non-discriminatory hypotheses, such as the regulation of ports and harbours
60. Case C-120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein
(“Cassis de Dijon”), EU:C:1979:42.
61. Case C-19/92, Kraus v. Land Baden-Württemberg, EU:C:1993:125, para 32.
62. Public interests already recognized by the ECJ include the objectives of road safety (e.g.
Case C-55/93, van Schaik,EU:C:1994:363, para 19, and Case C-54/05,Commission v.Finland,
EU:C:2007:168, para 40 and the case law cited therein), environmental protection (e.g. Case
302/86, Commission v. Denmark, EU:C:1988:421, para 9, and Case C-309/02, Radlberger
Getränkegesellschaft and S. Spitz, EU:C:2004:799, para 75) and consumer protection (e.g.
Case 220/83, Commission v. France, EU:C:1986:461, para 20; Case C-442/02, CaixaBank
France, EU:C:2004:586, para 21, and Case C-393/05,Commission v. Austria, EU:C:2007:722,
para 52 and the case law cited).
63. Case C-55/94, Gebhard, para 37.
64. As concluded in Case C-531/06, Commission v. Italy, EU:C:2009:315.
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and the relationship between the different types of companies operating within
them.65 A very recent example, AGET Iraklis,66 deals with collective
redundancies. The ECJ considers that Greek legislation in this area is contrary
to the Treaty because it “constitutes a significant interference in certain
freedoms which economic operators generally enjoy . . . and render(s) access
to the Greek market less attractive”.67
Another interesting episode in this jurisprudential saga is Case C-400/08,
Commission v. Spain, concerning the establishment of shopping centres in
Catalonia. The case can be easily summarized. The legislation challenged
before the ECJ was enacted by the Catalan Parliament, establishing a
regulation that limits the establishment of big supermarkets in medium or
small urban centres. The uncontested objective of the measure was a
combination of protection of small commerce and urban planning concerns
(both extremely sensitive questions in Catalonia). All affected companies
were Spanish juridical persons, because what is at stake is not the
establishment of the company but the opening, by already established
companies, of a new supermarket with no separate legal personality. The ECJ
did not observe any discriminatory treatment but subjected the analysis of this
legislation to the tests of necessity and proportionality, which it did not pass.
In the findings, the ECJ argued, inter alia, that the protection of small and
medium commerce cannot be included among the overriding reasons relating
to the general interest admitted by EU law; therefore, the legislation was
declared contrary to EU law.68
It could be argued that there is nothing new on all this, and that it is the same
rationale as the well-known Cassis de Dijon case law. This might be true, but
there is a major difference: the subject matter of the Treaty Chapter on the
Right of Establishment, as was discussed above, is completely different from
that of the Chapters on “movement” of goods, services, capital and workers.
In the case of the latter, national/domestic goods, services, capital and workers
do not need to enter their own country markets: they are “already in”; thus, the
first problem for foreign goods, services, capitals and workers is whether or
not they “can enter” (and freely enter, in the framework of EU integration) the
market of another Member State.
In the case of establishment, the subject matter is completely different:
establishment for nationals is not beyond question (and, in fact, the question
very often receives a negative answer: the authors of this article, for example,
cannot establish themselves in their own countries as architects or bankers, to
65. Case C-576/13, Commission v. Spain, EU:C:2014:2430.
66. Case C-201/15, AGET Iraklis, EU:C:2016:972.
67. Ibid., paras. 55–56.
68. Case C-400/08, Commission v. Spain, EU:C:2011:172.
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simply take these two cases, because they do not fulfil the requirements to do
so); thus, the problem for foreigners is not that of getting rid of the
requirements applicable to nationals in order to get established, but whether or
not they are subject to the same requirements. Therefore, the EEC Treaty
approached the situation rightly when (a) introducing a very wide national
treatment obligation (covering also, of course, de facto discrimination) and (b)
giving the Community a very wide competence to harmonize Member State
legislation.
Transforming EU integration into an instrument of deregulation of
establishment is, certainly, a legitimate political objective. But it distorts the
rationale of the treaties (“le système des traités”).
4.4. The evolution of EU secondary law, mainly Directive 2006/123/EC
concerning services in the internal market (the Bolkestein Directive)
This trend of deregulation is also reflected in EU secondary law. Directive
2000/31 on E-commerce is very illustrative, for example:69 regarding the
establishment regime, it provides as a general principle, in Article 4(1),
entitled “Principle excluding prior authorization”, that: “Member States shall
ensure that the taking up and pursuit of the activity of an information society
service provider may not be made subject to prior authorization or any other
requirement having equivalent effect”. In the same line, with a much greater
scope, is Directive 2006/123 relative to services in the internal market,70 also
widely known as the “Bolkestein Directive”71 from the name of the European
Commissioner who most pushed for it, which is of decisive importance in the
evolution of EU secondary law on the right of establishment. As it is
sufficiently well-known, we merely summarize some comments on it for the
sake of completeness.
69. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce in the
Internal Market (E-commerce Directive), O.J. 2000, L 178/16.
70. Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 Dec. 2006
on services in the internal market, O.J. 2006, L 376/36.
71. There is abundant literature on the Bolkestein Directive, its transposition and
implementation. See inter alia, Barnard, “Unravelling the Services Directive”, 45 CML Rev.
(2008), 323–394; De Waele, “The transposition and enforcement of the Services Directive: A
challenge for the European and national legal orders”, 15 EPL (2009), 523–531; De la
Quadra-Salcedo y Fernández del Castillo (Eds.), El Mercado Interior de Servicios en la Unión
Europea – Estudios sobre la Directiva 123/2006/CE Relativa a los Servicios en el Mercado
Interior (Marcial Pons, 2009); Stelkens, Weiß and Mirschberger (Eds.), The Implementation of
the EU Services Directive – Problems and Strategies (TMCAsser/Springer, 2012); and Wiberg,
The EU Services Directive – Law or Simply Policy? (Springer, 2014).
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The Directive was explicitly inspired by the clamorously failed “Lisbon
Strategy”, which (we should never forget this in order to understand the recent
evolution of the EU) was supposed to transform the EU economy into the most
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the whole world,
already by 2010 (sic).72 It addresses the whole services sector both from the
perspective of their free provision and of right of establishment. In its own
words, “this Directive aims at creating a legal framework to ensure the
freedom of establishment and the free movement of services between the
Member States”. It recognizes that, without prejudice to the direct effect of
Articles 49 and 56 TFEU, it would be “extremely complicated for national and
Community institutions” to continue to address measures contrary to those
provisions “on a case-by-case basis” and “through infringement procedures”
as was being done.
The Directive’s Chapter III deals specifically with “Freedom of
establishment for providers” (Arts. 9 and 15). Section 1 is entitled
“Authorizations” and intends, essentially, to codify the ECJ’s case law
commented above. Therefore, Member States’ authorization regimes must
pass a threefold test of, not only non-discrimination, but also necessity and
proportionality. The “overriding reasons relating to the public interest” that
can justify the restrictions on free establishment refer also explicitly to
ECJ case law. Furthermore, Article 14 includes a list of “prohibited
requirements” (such as the “economic needs test”) and Article 15 sets up a list
of “requirements to be evaluated” (such as “quantitative restrictions”,
“requirements which relate to the shareholding of a company”, “requirements
fixing a minimum number of employees” etc.). Concerning these
“requirements to be evaluated”, each Member State must verify, besides their
non-discriminatory character, their “necessity” with regard to an overriding
reason relating to the public interest and their “proportionality”.
As is well known, the enactment of the Bolkestein Directive aroused a
doctrinal debate, particularly intense in some countries.73 The criticisms of
the Directive are, in our opinion, perfectly justified from a strictly legal
72. See Directive 2006/123, Recital 4. The Lisbon Strategy was set out by the European
Council in March 2000: “Presidency Conclusions”, Lisbon European Council, 23 and 24
March 2000, <www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00100-r1.
en0.htm> (last visited 15 June 2017), see para 5.
73. See e.g., De la Quadra-Salcedo Janini, “¿Quo vadis Bolkestein? ¿Armonización o mera
desregulación de la prestación de servicios?”, 22Revista Española deDerecho Europeo (2007),
237–280; Parejo Alfonso, “La Directiva Bolkestein y la ley paraguas: ¿Legitima el fin
cualesquiera medios para la reconversión del Estado ‘autoritativo’?”, 32 Revista Española de
Derecho Europeo (2009), 431–467; Chang, Hang and Pelkmans, “The Services Directive:
Trojan horse or white knight?”, 32 Journal Eur. Int. (2010), 97–114; and Grossman and Woll,
“The French debate over the Bolkestein Directive”, 9 Comparative European Politics (2011),
344–366.
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perspective (leaving aside the criticism of its underlying policy approach). It
misuses secondary law, envisaged in principle to harmonize Member State
legislation in the areas of provision of services and establishment. The
Directive’s confessed goal is not that one, but the prohibition of any Member
State legislation and the introduction of a principle of “unrestricted freedom of
establishment”, subject only to “justified limitations”. In a way, the Directive
uses secondary law to modify primary law or, at least, unbalances its choice of
types of rules. The Right of Establishment Chapter becomes no longer based
on a) the acceptance of Member State regulated establishment, b) subject to a
very strict national treatment obligation and c) to the possible enactment of
EU harmonizing legislation. It is turned into a Chapter based on complete
liberalization of access subject only to restrictions which are quite difficult to
justify.
It is clear that some provisions of the Bolkestein Directive, such as the
quoted Article 15 on “quantitative restrictions”, have a wording and a
rationale partially similar to GATS Article XVI on “market access”, but there
are some important differences: GATS establishes a prohibition of
quantitative restrictions with the aforementioned system of “positive list” and,
when the prohibition is applicable to a sector included in the list and there are
no exemptions, a restriction can only be justified under the exhaustive
exceptions set up in other Articles of the GATS. Article 15 of the Bolkestein
Directive is more general, as it establishes a general obligation to “evaluate”
these quantitative restrictions, but it also recognizes explicitly that they can be
justified in the light of an “overriding reason relating to the public interest”, an
open clause which remains faithful to the ECJ case law.
Therefore, from the point of view of the “right to regulate” of the host State,
both models (GATS and Bolkestein) have lights and shadows. But, as we will
see in the next section regarding CETA, it is possible to design a new model
much more restrictive of this right to regulate, dimming the lights and
lengthening the shadows.
5. CETA on substance: Compounding GATS and NAFTA/BITs
influences. The complete surrender of the original EC approach
In spite of the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice in 2001, Association
Agreements with Eastern European and Mediterranean States continued to
follow the old pre-Nice Association Agreements approach. We have already
seen this in the case of the 2014–2016 Agreement with Ukraine. The analysis
of the last “Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements” is not so relevant
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for the purposes of this article, because the last one signed is from 2002 (with
Lebanon) and its Chapters on services and establishment are nearly empty of
obligations.
In December 2009, as mentioned, the entry into force of the Treaty of
Lisbon modified again the definition of the scope of the EU’s Commercial
Policy. As foreign direct investment was included explicitly in paragraph 1 of
the new Article 207 TFEU, there was no longer a need to introduce it through
the back door as GATS “mode 3”/commercial presence. A fully-fledged
Chapter on foreign direct investment/establishment could be envisaged,
taking as main templates NAFTA (and similar agreements) and BITs.
The European Commission moved immediately into this direction, with the
acquiescence of the Council, the Parliament and Member State governments.
The Commission has pushed its new policy in the framework of the
agreements with Singapore (2015),74 Vietnam (2016)75 and, in particular,
Canada (the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement –
CETA).76 It has also been reported that this direction will be followed in the
update/modernization of the agreements with Mexico and Chile.77
However, the acceptance of the NAFTA/BIT framework has not meant the
abandonment of the former GATS template. Both influences have been
compounded and, as a result, the original EEC/EC approach has been
completely lost sight of.
This evolution has reached its peak in CETA. CETA follows the same
approach of the agreements with Singapore and Vietnam, with two main
characteristics:
a) Conservation of the GATS influence with the importation of its
Article XVI as a rule of “market access”, not only for international
exchanges of services but also for establishment (in all sectors).
b) Importation of the substantive rules typically found in NAFTA and
BITs. They include, in particular, as mentioned in section 3.4,
74. See the text of the EU-Singapore FTA (authentic text as of May 2015) at <www.trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961> (last visited 15 June 2017).
75. See the text of the EU-Vietnam FTA (agreed text as of Jan. 2016) at <www.trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437> (last visited 15 June 2017).
76. See the text of the CETA in Council of the EU, Interinstitutional File 2016/0206 (NLE),
Brussels, 14 Sept. 2016, 10973/16, <www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/
10/28-eu-canada-trade-agreement/> and <www.ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-
chapter-by-chapter/> (both last visited 15 June 2017).
77. Torrent and Polanco, op. cit. supra note 1; Torrent and Polanco, Analysis of the Prospect
for Updating the Trade Pillar of the European Union-Chile Association Agreement, Paper
requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on International Trade (2016), <www.
europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/535013/EXPO_STU(2016)535013_EN.pdf>
(last visited 15 June 2017).
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notions completely unknown to EU primary and secondary law,
such as those of “direct and indirect expropriation” and “fair and
equitable treatment”.
CETA introduces a very meaningful change, however: for the determination
of the scope of obligations, the method of the GATS “positive list” (still used
in the agreements with Singapore and Vietnam) is replaced by that of the
“negative list”, typical of NAFTA and some BITs, both in the Chapters on
services and on investment/establishment. Therefore, obligations no longer
apply “only if a sector is included in the Schedule of commitments and in the
conditions in which it is included” (the method of the positive list, or
“bottom-up” method); but obligations “apply to all sectors except if specific
sectors and/or measures are included in a negative list of exceptions or
reservations” (the method of the negative list, or “top-down” method). This
change is particularly relevant when applied to market access in the Chapter
on investment/establishment. The main provisions are Article 8(4) in the
Chapter on investment, which, again, copies and pastes Article XVI of GATS
with only very minor variations in drafting78 (as well as Art. 9(6) of the
Chapter on services79) and Article 8(15), which states that “Articles 8(4)
through 8(8) do not apply to …” a list of exceptions, with references to the
78. See Art. 8(4) on “Market access”, in Ch. 8 “Investment” of CETA:
“1. A Party shall not adopt or maintain with respect to market access through establishment
by an investor of the other Party, on the basis of its entire territory or on the basis of the territory
of a national, provincial, territorial, regional or local level of government, a measure that:
(a) imposes limitations on:
(i) the number of enterprises that may carry out a specific economic activity
whether in the form of numerical quotas, monopolies, exclusive suppliers or
the requirement of an economic needs test;
(ii) the total value of transactions or assets in the form of numerical quotas or the
requirement of an economic needs test;
(iii) the total number of operations or the total quantity of output expressed in
terms of designated numerical units in the form of quotas or the requirement
of an economic needs test;
(iv) the participation of foreign capital in terms of maximum percentage limit on
foreign shareholding or the total value of individual or aggregate foreign
investment; or
(v) the total number of natural persons that may be employed in a particular sector
or that an enterprise may employ and who are necessary for, and directly
related to, the performance of economic activity in the form of numerical
quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test; or
(b) restricts or requires specific types of legal entity or joint venture through which an
enterprise may carry out an economic activity.”
79. Art. 9(6) applies also to services the GATS Art. XVI provisions that can be so applied.
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Schedules of exceptions (an equivalent provision exists in the Chapter on
services).80
As a result of the use of the negative list method, CETA has to include
extremely long Annexes/Schedules of reservations and exceptions (Annexes I
and II),81 in addition to the list of carved-out sectors (essentially the same as
the EU-Vietnam and EU-Singapore agreements): 223 pages for the list of
reservations for existing measures and liberalization commitments (on
investment and cross-border supply of services); and 158 pages for the list of
reservations for future measures. However, this negative list cannot, as a
matter of principle, include the “new sectors” that will certainly develop in the
future as a result of technological change. They will necessarily be covered by
CETA’s liberalization provisions in the CETA approach (because they are not
carved-out or included in the lists of exceptions).
CETA certainly fits within the evolution of EU internal secondary
legislation and of the ECJ case law analysed in the previous section. However,
it is an unprecedented leap in this evolution, which – if finally entering into
force – may have irreversible consequences for the EU, due to the following
reasons:
(i) First, because the evolution of EU internal secondary legislation and of
the ECJ case law is addressed to (one could say, for the sake of clarity,
is addressed “against”) Member States, and is not necessarily ap-
plicable with the same criteria to EU’s secondary law.82 Therefore, in
the EU framework, the strengthening of the restrictions imposed on
Member State legislation does not necessarily have an “anti-regulatory
bias” (even if this bias underlies such a strengthening) because it is
80. See Art. 9(7) on “Reservations”, in Ch. 9 “Cross-border trade in services” of CETA.
81. Therefore, Art. 8(15) CETA misuses the term “exceptions” in order to refer to what
should properly be called “exemptions” (see supra note 14).
82. This issue is quite abundantly discussed, see following footnote. From the perspective of
specific pieces of legislation, the reader could usefully take some time to read two pieces of
secondary law: first, Directive 2000/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8
May 2000 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the noise emission
in the environment by equipment for use outdoors, O.J. 2000, L161/1, with its 78 thick pages of
small print, full of designs and formulae. It is pretty clear that Member State legislation daring
to impose such requirements would be found contrary to the Cassis de Dijon case law. Would a
Directive be considered so? The second is the EU legislation on banking. If a very reasonable
and sensible obligation imposed by the French legislation was found by the ECJ contrary to the
primary law on establishment, does it mean that many more detailed provisions in that
secondary law (much more restrictive and much more dependent on the political judgment of
the legislature) are also contrary to primary law? There is no doubt that the ECJ is much stricter
when analysing the compatibility with primary law of Member States’ legislation than when it
analyses that of EC/EU harmonizing rules (an approach which, furthermore, makes sense from
the perspective of “positive integration”).
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compatible with a strengthening of the EU regulation through sec-
ondary law.83 CETA’s obligations apply also to EU secondary law and
restrict not only the regulatory capacity of Member States but also that
of the EU itself.
(ii) Second, because we know, from the first EEA Opinion of the ECJ,84
that provisions with identical texts may have different meanings in the
EC/EU context and in the context of bilateral EC/EU agreements with
third countries. Obligations and provisions that promote integration in
the framework of the EC and EU Treaties can have deleterious effects
for integration in the context of bilateral agreements with third
countries that do not embed the integrationist rationale of the EU
Treaties.85
(iii) Third, because, in the EU framework, the strengthening of the re-
strictions imposed to Member States legislations is modulated and
tempered by the interpretation by the ECJ. Whereas, in the CETA
context, the strengthening of the restrictions on regulation (not only by
Member States but by the EU itself) is left to the judgment of an
international dispute settlement mechanism (see the next section)
completely separated from that of the ECJ.
The two main consequences of this audacious leap forward are, first, it grants
to Canadian investors – either natural persons or companies – a right that EU
citizens and companies do not have. If we take France, for example, it is clear
that French companies and citizens do not have in France the market access
83. On “regulation”, “deregulation” etc. in EU law, see Armstrong, Regulation,
Deregulation, Re-regulation: The Paradoxes of EU Governance (Kogan Page, 2000), who
underlines a paradox of EU governance, which pursues a “deregulatory liberal economic
agenda” and, at the same time, is an “over-zealous regulator” in many areas. See also Weatherill,
“Constitutional issues in the implementation of EC law: Addressing the imbalance in favour of
market deregulation”, Paper for the fifth biennial international conference on European
Community Studies Association (Seattle, 1997), <www.aei.pitt.edu/2751/1/002719_1.pdf>
(last visited 15 June 2017), analysing the relationships and imbalances between two species of
Community law, the “law of market integration” and the “law of market regulation”; Weatherill
(Ed.),Better Regulation (Hart Publishing, 2007); and Dawson, “Better regulation and the future
of EU regulatory law and politics”, 54 CML Rev. (2016), 1209–1236.
84. Opinion 1/91, European Economic Area Agreement – I, EU:C:1991:490.
85. There is a very relevant example in the TFEU Chapter on capital and payments (which
also covers “investment”). It could be argued that a provision of primary law (Art. 63)
establishing complete liberalization of capital movements between Member States is
“integrationist”. But when the very same provision extends this liberalization to capital
movements to and from third countries, the provision becomes “anti-integrationist” because it
restricts the Union’s margin of manoeuvre in the area of macroeconomic policy and e.g. creates
a nearly insurmountable difficulty for the Union to adhere to an international agreement
establishing some restrictions on movements of capital (this problem already appeared in the
discussion of whether the Union could establish some sort of “Tobin tax”).
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rights granted to Canadians by CETA’s Article 8(4). Even more significantly
from the perspective of European integration: it is clear that German or
Swedish companies and citizens do not have in France the market access rights
granted to Canadians by CETA’s Article 8(4).86 This “reverse discrimination”
(“discrimination à rebours”), however shocking for many, does make sense in
some cases, precisely concerning foreign direct investment/establishment. For
example, it seems reasonable that an international agreement on investment
institutes, in the area of expropriation, some rules of uniform law granting
some rights to foreign investors even if national ones do not have them. The
objective of the agreement is not that of guaranteeing to foreign investors that
they will be treated “as badly as” national investors but to guarantee them
some absolute level of protection, even if nationals do not have this.
Secondly, and most importantly, CETA completes the surrender of EU law
to the combined and compounded influence of GATS and NAFTA/BITs. In
CETA, any EC/TFEU “flavour” or “soul” has been lost and the
“positive/negative” integration dynamics have been surrendered to an
anti-regulationist objective. In the Treaty of Rome there was no need to refer
to the “right to regulate” concerning establishment, because it was never put
into question by the obligation to grant national treatment. Conversely,
the more CETA expands its lists of exceptions, the more it refers to the
preservation of the “right to regulate”, the more it demonstrates the
anti-regulationist bias of its main foundations.
This anti-regulationist bias is demonstrated best in a sort of Freudian lapsus
committed by the EU in a hidden but revealing sentence included in CETA.
Indeed, when the EU introduces its Schedule of Reservations in Annex II of
CETA (p. 1295, sic), it defines “internal market for services and
establishment” and “right of establishment” as follows: “An internal market
on services and establishment means an area without internal frontiers in
which the free movement of services, capital and persons is ensured. The right
of establishment means an obligation to abolish in substance all barriers to
establishment among the parties to the regional economic integration
agreement by the entry into force of that agreement” (emphasis added). This
definition of right of establishment, importing the notion of “barriers”, so
typical of the trade jargon, as “an obligation to abolish in substance all
barriers” is completely different from that given by the TFEU: “[R]estrictions
on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory
86. Of course, CETA cannot be construed as an “agreement between EU Member States”
either. It is an agreement between two sides, with Canada on one side and the EU and its
Member States on the other. The interested reader could compare it with the DR-CAFTA
agreement, which, contrariwise, is not only an agreement of the different Central American
countries (and the Dominican Republic) with the United States, but also an agreement between
the former.
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of another Member State shall be prohibited.” It is very revealing that, in such
an important question of principle, the EU does not copy-paste from the
TFEU, but invents an ad hoc anti-regulationist definition.87
6. CETA on procedure: Setting up a mechanism of investor-to-State
dispute settlement applicable to the European Union
CETA originally included an ISDS mechanism, following the trend that EU
Member States have followed for decades in their individual BITs (and a
mechanism that is also included in NAFTA, and the large majority of PTAs
with investment Chapters). It is important to note that CETA does not follow,
in this issue, GATS, which, like all WTO agreements, only envisages a
State-to-State dispute settlement mechanism.
The existence of ISDS has become one of the main points of criticism of
IIAs, although several voices also defend the existence of this mechanism.88
By way of reaction to these criticisms, CETA “improves” this dispute
settlement mechanism, establishing a standing investment tribunal and an
appellate court for investment disputes between investors and host States, in
contrast to the ad hoc nature of the arbitral tribunals that are appointed under
traditional ISDS.
We do not want to enter into this political-legal discussion as far as the
application of the mechanism to States is concerned (in fact, the three authors’
views are not completely coincident on this political judgement). We wish to
87. The invention can certainly claim some foundation in the ECJ’s case law, as we already
discussed. But it goes much further than that case law, and reveals a sort of anti-regulatory
obsession. First, it adds “by the entry into force of that agreement”, meaning that “barriers”
should be eliminated from the very beginning (a condition that, of course, not even the
EEC/TFEU fulfils). Second, it does not add the nuances introduced by the ECJ itself in its case
law.
88. This debate has been very intense with regard to ISDS provisions in the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP), the CETA and, particularly, the negotiations of the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP). See inter alia Quick, “Why TTIP should have an investment
chapter including ISDS”, 49 JWT (2015), 199–209; Kumm, “An empire of capital?
Transatlantic investment protection as the institutionalization of unjustified privilege”, 4 ESIL
Reflections (2015), <www.esil-sedi.eu/node/944> (last visited 17 June 2017); Henckels,
“Protecting regulatory autonomy through greater precision in investment treaties: The TPP,
CETA, and TTIP”, 19 Journal of International Economic Law (2016), 27–50; Schacherer,
“TPP, CETA and TTIP between innovation and consolidation – Resolving investor-State
disputes under mega-regionals”, 7 Journal of International Dispute Settlement (2016),
628–653; Laird, “TPP and ISDS:The challenge from Europe and the proposedTTIP investment
court”, 40 Canada and United States Law Journal (2016), 106–125; and Tietje and Crow, “The
reform of investment protection rules in CETA, TTIP and other recent EU-FTAs: Convincing?”
(2016), <www.ssrn.com/abstract=2885279> (last visited 17 June 2017).
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concentrate on the specific issue of the application of the mechanism to the
EU, whose “constitutional” system is completely different from that of any
State. From this perspective, what matters is not the improvements that,
according to the European Commission,89 CETA introduces in the mechanism
by comparison to NAFTA and BITs, but its main “constitutional”
characteristic.
In CETA, there is an innovation, by reference to NAFTA/BITs, concerning
the relationship between international settlement of investment-related
disputes and procedures before internal jurisdictions. There is no definitive
“fork-in-the-road” provision,90 but the whole purpose of the mechanism
remains to avoid parallel proceedings. Investors can seek redress in national
courts, but then move to file a claim before the CETA Investment Tribunal. It
is not clear how this can or would work in practice, but what is relevant for us
is:
a) that the mechanism applies also to the EU, as established by Article
8(21) on the “determination of the respondent for disputes with the
European Union or its Member States” and;
b) that the mechanism allows a company established in a Member
State and controlled by Canadian nationals or companies to escape
the jurisdiction of the ECJ. This is clearly established in Article
8(23).91
This is indeed the main point: in conformity with this set of provisions,
CETA’s investment courts system allows foreign investors in an EU Member
State to escape the jurisdictional control of national jurisdictions and, more
significantly, that of the ECJ. This means that foreign investors, and the
companies they own or control in a EUMember State, have a possibility open
89. The Commission states that the new investment court system included in CETA will
“be public, not be based on temporary tribunals, have professional and independent judges,
work transparently, limit the grounds on which an investor can challenge a State, and prevent
public bodies from being forced to change legislation or pay damages”: see Commission,
“CETA explained: Creating opportunities for your business”, <www.ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/
in-focus/ceta/ceta-explained/> (last visited 15 June 2017).
90. Meaning that, once a road is taken (international or domestic procedure), there is no
possibility to move to the other road.
91. Art. 8(23) CETA: “1. If a dispute has not been resolved through consultations, a claim
may be submitted under this Section by: (a) an investor of a Party on its own behalf; or (b) an
investor of a Party, on behalf of a locally established enterprise which it owns or controls
directly or indirectly. 2. A claim may be submitted under the following rules: (a) the ICSID
Convention and Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings; (b) the ICSID Additional
Facility Rules if the conditions for proceedings pursuant to paragraph (a) do not apply; (c) the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; or (d) any other rules on agreement of the disputing parties”
(our emphasis).
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to them that nationals of that EU Member State and companies owned or
controlled by them do not have: so, a “treatment better than national
treatment”. But, as we have said before, this, however shocking, does not
necessarily contradict EU primary law, and, for some issues, it can even make
sense in an international treatment on investment.
The decisive problem lies in the fact that the “locus” of the judiciary is
completely different in the EU and EU Member States national constitutional
frameworks. In the national constitutional frameworks, constitutions contain
very few provisions on the judiciary and leave to the legislature the regulation
of the judiciary, including, in particular, its competences. Therefore, it could
be construed that the legislature can also deprive the judiciary (by ratifying an
international treaty) of some of the competences it has given to it by law.
The situation is completely different in EU law, however. In the EU’s
“constitutional” framework, there is no “law on the judiciary”. The whole
structure and competences of the judiciary are established by primary law.
Therefore, the EU legislature cannot (by concluding an international treaty)
deprive the judiciary of the competences conferred to it by primary law (and
cannot deprive legal and natural persons – and EU Member States themselves
– of their rights to have recourse to the EU’s judiciary system when it is
competent, in particular when what is at stake is the conformity of EU law
with CETA).
It must be underlined that the hypothesis we are discussing has absolutely
nothing to do with others that have already been considered by the ECJ since
its two Opinions on the Agreement on the European Economic Area, which
essentially discussed its dispute settlement procedures. In this case and others,
the point of discussion was a dispute settlement mechanism between EU
Member States, or the EU as such, with third countries: an international
dispute.92 The hypothesis we are discussing in CETA is that of a juridical
person incorporated in a EU Member State which, because it is owned or
controlled by a foreign investor, is able to escape, in an internal dispute with
the EU (or one of its Member States), the internal jurisdiction of the ECJ.This
has no EU jurisprudential precedent.93 In our opinion, there is no doubt that
92. Opinion 2/13, Accession of the European Union to the ECHR, EU:C:2014:2454, could,
nevertheless, be relevant because it concerns disputes involving individuals and States. More
relevant could be Opinion 1/09, Draft agreement on the creation of a unified patent litigation
system, EU:C:2011:123, where the envisaged agreement would create a unified patent
litigation system with a Patents Court.Prima facie, it seems that the arguments developed by the
ECJ that led it to declare such an agreement incompatible with EU primary law apply, even
more, to the investment courts system instituted by CETA. However, we do not want to overload
this article by bringing in this discussion.
93. The Energy Charter Treaty is not a valid precedent for the purposes of this article
because it has never been brought to the consideration of the ECJ. From a political perspective,
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offering to individual and legal persons the possibility to escape the
jurisdiction of the ECJ is manifestly contrary to the EU Treaties.
7. Conclusions
In the preceding sections we have tried to examine the facts (legal facts, but
facts) surrounding the evolution of investment regulation in the EU.
We believe that the development of EU law and policy in the area of foreign
investment, in the last 25–30 years, has increasingly been influenced by
elaborations that have taken place outside the EU framework, mainly by
GATS, NAFTA and BITs, and that the movement in this direction has
accelerated in CETA. If that analysis of the evolution is true, some questions
necessarily arise: Is this correct from the point of view of EU law coherence?
Is this right in terms of integration? Does this benefit EU citizens and their
allegiance to the EU integration process and their authorities?
These are political questions that can legitimately receive different answers.
We have our own opinions (and, as we have already said, they do not fully
coincide). However, we are not alone in believing that the Treaty of Rome was
a remarkable and well-oriented legal and political achievement, which put
into motion a very robust integration process that achieved, in only 25–30
years, a great success. We are very doubtful about the soundness of sacrificing
its Chapter on establishment, in the area of external economic relations, in
order to import other approaches completely alien to the logic of European
integration.
In our opinion, this development in the area of external economic relations
also sheds new light on the development of EU secondary law and ECJ’s case
law in the area of the internal market. The underlying rationale and the
analytical approach are the same in both areas: construing right of
establishment in EU law as a “right to exercise an economic activity” (both for
foreigners and nationals) and not as a rule on national treatment that respects
the regulatory capacity of Member States, provided that it is not
discriminatory (de iure and de facto) and subject to the possible (and
welcomed) exercise by the EU of its harmonizing competences. The historical
it must be taken into account that the Energy Charter (and even the Energy Charter Treaty) were
signed (1991 and 1994, respectively) before the failed negotiations of the Multilateral
Agreement on Investment in the OECD framework (1995–1998) raised the awareness on all
international investment-related issues. From a legal perspective, the proliferation of disputes
that have taken place in recent years between individual Member States and companies
established in them, but owned or controlled by nationals and companies of other Member
States, simply proves how the possible dangers we analyse in the text can become reality,
involving not only Member States, but also the EU.
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context is also the same (a factor that analysts have not sufficiently
emphasized):
a) Internationally, the appearance of the GATS and NAFTA/BITs
approaches in the first part of the 1990s; and,
b) internally, the change of approach by the European Commission,
from harmonization of Member States legislation in very sensitive
sectors (in particular, energy and public ownership of industrial and
commercial firms), where it certainly, and unfortunately, failed to
achieve sufficient results, towards simply curtailing the exercise by
Member States of their regulatory capacity; applying this approach,
the law of external economic relations becomes a welcome means
to further restrict Member States ability to regulate.
This approach is very dangerous and may be the object of legitimate criticism,
but it certainly makes sense. The problem appears when the development in
the internal area, addressed mainly “against” Member States, becomes, in the
external area, a development, also, “against” the EU itself and the exercise of
its regulatory capacity. This borderline is the one that CETA clearly crosses.
First, because it compounds the influences of GATS and of NAFTA/BITs,
never so compounded in the past, and will complete, if it ultimately enters into
force, the surrender of EU law to these two legal orders. Second, because, by
locking-in this approach in an EU international agreement, it undermines the
regulatory capacity not only of Member States but of the EU itself. Thirdly,
because, by removing from the effective control of the EU jurisdiction
disputes involving companies established in EU Member States, it erodes one
of the main pillars of EU integration: the role of the ECJ.
If the analysis is correct, the underlying rationale of the approach becomes
obvious: the rationale was not, and is not, one of favouring integration but one
of favouring deregulation. The developments in the external economic
relations area unveil the rationale of the developments in the area of the
internal market. Was (is) the ECJ aware of it? Furthermore, is the ECJ aware
that, besides being an instrument of de-regulation, it has become an
instrument for “GATSizing”, “NAFTAsizing” and “BITsizing” EU law?
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